A multi-agent planning problem consists of a set of activities that need to be planned by several agents. Here, plan coordination methods play an important role, since the independently generated plans by different agents can lead to an infeasible joint solution. We study one particular plan coordination approach, called coordination-by-design, which allows each agent to make its own plan completely independent of the others, while guaranteeing the feasibility of the combined plan of all the agents as a joint solution to the multi-agent planning problem. In this paper, we are interested in a class of multi-agent planning problems that arise in supply-chain management applications. Although the coordination problem in general is Σ p 2 -complete, it turns out for this special class, the complexity of coordination checking is polynomial and deciding a minimum coordination set is NP-complete. We develop a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute a sufficient coordination set.
INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent planning requires a collection of agents to solve a joint problem together. Typically, each of the agents is capable of solving only a (disjoint) part of the problem and would like to choose its problem solving method, solution or plan independently of the others. However, due to possible dependencies between the solutions provided, it is not guaranteed that these individual, partial solutions always can be merged into a feasible overall solution. Therefore, we need to provide a coordination mechanism. Let us give a simple transportation example to illustrate the need for such a coordination mechanism.
Example 1.1. We have to transport two packages p 1 and p 2 . Package p 1 at location X has to be delivered first to location Y (task t 1 ), and then to location Z (task t 3 ); package p 2 at Z has to be delivered first to Y (task t 4 ) and then to X (task t 2 ). There are also two truck agents A 1 and A 2 . Agent A 1 can access locations X and Y , while agent A 2 can access only Y and Z. To transport the packages, both agents have to construct a move plan. If they would plan completely independently from each other, agent A 1 could come up with a plan to move from Y to X (transporting p 2 ) and then from X to Y (transporting p 1 ). Likewise, A 2 could decide first to move from Y to Z (transporting p 1 ) and then to move from Z to Y (transporting p 2 ). Combining those two plans, however, gives an infeasible plan: both agents will have to wait for a package to arrive at Y and therefore can not complete their tasks. In this example, a coordination mechanism could require A 1 to plan transporting p 1 before p 2 , thereby ensuring the feasibility of a joint plan.
Coordination in multi-agent planning can be viewed as an attempt to achieve a conflict-free joint plan given a set of self-interested multi-agent planners. In the multi-agent system community, quite some effort has been done to attack this problem (Durfee, 1999) . The plan merging approach (Foulser et al., 1992; von Martial, 1992; Tonino et al., 2002) , for example, focuses on the techniques that resolve conflicts after independently generated plans have been developed by different agents. Here, agents are required to exchange, negotiate, and revise their (partial) individual plans to arrive at a joint solution. Another approach treats coordination and planning as intertwined processes (Durfee and Lesser, 1991; Ephrati and Rosenschein, 1993; Lesser et al., 2004) , where agents continuously exchange information during their planning in order to achieve a conflictfree solution. In these two coordination approaches, agents have to be cooperative: they should be willing to exchange their private information with others, and to revise their plans if necessary.
We would like to address the problem from the coordination-by-design perspective, that is, how to provide just sufficient coordination constraints on agents before the agents start to solve their own subproblem, such that (i) a joint solution is always coordinated, yet (ii) each agent can construct its plan independently from others. One advantage of such a pre-planning coordination approach is that it can be applied without relying on the assumption of cooperativeness of the agents. The general results obtained in this approach can be summarized as follows (Steenhuisen et al., 2008) : Checking whether or not agents can plan independently without coordinating them is a co-NP-complete problem. Secondly, finding a minimum number of constraints such that coordination is achieved is Σ p 2 -complete. Later, the authors presented a polynomial algorithm, called the Depth-Partitioning Algorithm, which can be used to obtain a sufficient (but not necessarily minimum) set of coordination constraints. However, it only has been shown that this algorithm provides rather good results for logistic planning problems (as used in the AIPS-planning competition). Furthermore (ter Mors, 2004) identified two special cases where the coordination problem becomes computationally easier: the case where an agent has at most one single task, and the cases where all tasks with incoming or outgoing inter-agent arcs are totally ordered amongst themselves. However, these two cases are very restricted and hardly represent any real-world problems.
Built upon the previous work on the coordinationby-design approach, our main contributions in this paper are as follows:
Firstly, we identify a special class of interesting multi-agent planning problems that is well-motivated by supply chain management applications and we demonstrate that these problems form a class of coordination instances with a particular structure, called intra-free instances (Section 3). Secondly, we show (in Section 4) that for intra-free coordination instances can be easily decided whether they are coordinated or not, using a so-called agent dependency graph and it can be showed that the coordination problem becomes NP-complete, which means the complexity can be lowered one step in the polynomial hierarchy. Thirdly, we propose a new polynomial approximation algorithm for obtaining sufficient, but not necessarily minimum, coordination sets for the intra-free instances (Section 4.1).
Before presenting our main contributions, in the next section we introduce a formal model of the multiagent coordination problem.
PRELIMINARIES
To formalize the multi-agent coordination problem, we assume that there is complex task T that has to be solved by a set A = {A 1 , . . . , A n } of agents. Such a complex task is a partial order T =< T, ≺ > consisting of a finite set T = {t 1 , . . . ,t m } of primitive tasks t i and a precedence relation ≺ on T , where t i ≺ t j indicates that t i must be completed before t j can start 1 . Each task t ∈ T is assumed to be performed by a single agent and we also assume that each agent A i has already been assigned to a disjoint subset T i of T . Hence, the set T can be represented by a partition-
We will often represent a coordination instance
Example 2.1. Consider Example 1.1 discussed in the previous section. The set of tasks T = {t 1 ,t 2 ,t 3 ,t 4 } is (partially) ordered by t 1 ≺ t 3 ; 2 similarly, t 4 ≺ t 2 . As the agents A 1 and A 2 can only access a part of the infrastructure, the task allocation is as follows:
Notice that there are no intra-agent precedence constraints, i.e., ≺ 1 =≺ 2 = / 0.
Each individual agent A i receives a partially ordered set of tasks T i , ≺ i and has to come up with a plan to complete its set of tasks T i respecting the set of constraints ≺ i . We don't need to know the exact details of such plans, only the consequences w.r.t. the ordering of the tasks in T i are important. Therefore, we assume a plan of agent A i to be represented by an arbitrary partial order ≺ * i refining ≺ i , i.e., a relation that extends ≺ i . A joint plan for T then is a
n is not acyclic. 3 Example 2.2. Continuing Example 2.1, the agents A 1 and A 2 receive the subtask T 1 = {t 1 ,t 2 }, ≺ 1 = / 0 and T 2 = {t 3 ,t 4 }, ≺ 2 = / 0 , respectively. Suppose they construct the following plans independently from each other: A 1 comes up with a refinement ≺ *
These two refinements ≺ * 1 and ≺ * 2 , together with the precedence relation ≺= {t 1 ≺ t 3 ,t 4 ≺ t 2 }, create a cycle: t 3 ≺ * t 4 ≺ * t 2 ≺ * t 1 ≺ * t 3 . Therefore, the joint plan is infeasible.
In general, a joint plan can become infeasible since the individual constraints ≺ i on the tasks T i given to the agents do not take into account the interagent constraints t ≺ t where t and t belong to different agents. Therefore, we have to come up with additional constraints to ensure that whatever partially ordered extensions of the individual precedence relations ≺ i are chosen, their combination together with the inter-agent constraints always constitutes a partial order, i.e., a feasible plan for the complex task T .
Example 2.3. Continuing Example 2.2, let us give an additional constraint t 1 ≺ t 2 to agent A 1 . Notice that now the subproblems of the two agents become:
. In this case, any feasible refinement of agent A 2 on ≺ 2 will always constitute a partial order (feasible solution) for T .
So, we state the coordination checking problem as follows: Given a coordination instance {T i } n i=1 , ≺ check whether every possible combination of partially ordered refinements T i , ≺ * i results in a joint plan that is feasible, i.e., whether ≺ * =≺ ∪ ≺ * 1 ∪ . . . ∪ ≺ * n is acyclic. More in general, the coordination problem is to find a minimum set of additional precedence constraints such that feasibility of the joint plan is always guaranteed. As mentioned before, these easyto-state pre-planning problems, however, turn out to be computationally very difficult: Checking whether a coordination instance T is already coordinated is co-NP-complete and the problem to find a minimum extension of ≺ that guarantees a coordinated solution is Σ p 2 -complete. These results, however, do hold for the general case. While special cases like constraining the number of agents or the number of tasks already have been investigated (ter Mors, 2004), we would like to investigate structurally restricted sub cases. Hence, 3 A cycle in a plan would indicate that the plan can't be executed: completion of task t would need the completion of another task t and vice-versa.
in the next section, we look into some special applications of the coordination problem, such as supply chain management, showing that in these applications it is often sufficient to consider instances of the coordination problem where no precedence relations exist between tasks given to the same agent. We call such instances intra-free coordination instances.
SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORKS
Supply chain management is the management of material and information flows both in and between enterprises (Kazemi et al., 2009) . Figure 1 depicts a simple supply chain network, where five different enterprises are involved: a product manufacturer, a cross dock, a raw material supplier and two retailers. The cross dock is an enterprise which does not produce anything, but is simply involved in distribution of products and raw materials. The flow of goods between the enterprises is indicated by the directed arrows. Coordination in a supply chain network focusses on coordinating the activities and plans of the individual enterprises involved in the supply chain. Note here that we focus only on the topological task structure and ignore all other factors such as costs, time points, inventory levels.
The supply chain management problem has been studied extensively in operations research (see (Chen and Decker, 2004) ), and some in the agent community (Caridi and Sianesi, 2000; Kazemi et al., 2009 ). Most research in this field, however, assumes that each of the enterprises is either cooperative or owned by a single enterprise. Hence a centralised optimization solution can be used to solve the problem. However, situations commonly exist where enterprises are selfish and non-cooperative. In such cases, our preplanning coordination approach provides an attractive alternative for managing and coordinating the plans of selfish enterprises in a supply chain network. The entire set of activities in the supply chain network can be represented as a partial order (T, ≺), where T represents the set of tasks (the nodes) and ≺ represents the set of precedence relations (represented by directed arcs). The enterprises are represented by agents each having a set of tasks. The coordination problem now is to find a minimum set of precedence constraints such that each enterprise can plan its own activities independently from the others, while the joint plan is guaranteed to be feasible. As an example, a solution to the particular instance in Figure 1 would be adding a set of two coordination constraints: Send R 1 before Send P 1 , P 2 ; and Send R 2 before Send P 1 , P 2 . We can easily check that these two coordination constraints ensure that no cycles or deadlocks can be formed by any plans generated individually by each enterprise.
Notice that there is an interesting feature in the supply chain management problem as a coordination problem: usually, an enterprise has no internal restrictions on its own activities or tasks. 4 To the enterprise, one advantage of having no internal (intraagent) precedence constraints is that the enterprise itself can enjoy the maximal freedom when planning its own activities. As mentioned before, we call such an instance intra-free. Notice that in intra-free instances, each subgraph G T i associated with the set of tasks allocated to agent A i is the empty graph on V T i , i.e., there are no precedence relations between tasks assigned to the same agent.
We show that for intra-free instances the coordination problems are computationally easier.
ANALYZING INTRA-FREE COORDINATION INSTANCES
As we remarked before, in general, the coordination (checking) problem is a computationally intractable problem. Supply-chain like coordination problems, however, can be modelled by intra-free coordination instances and might be easier to solve. To start our analysis, we define a special subclass of intra-free coordination instances. We call it strictly intra-free, which will be of special importance in proving properties of intra-free coordination instances:
, ≺ is called strictly intra-free if, for every i, the subset of (isolated) nodes V T i of the graph G T can be partitioned in two disjoint subsets In(V T i ) and 4 Note here that based on the policy of the manufacturer, it could either choose to manufacture first or send products first based on his inventory levels and its inventory policy.
Out(V T i ) such that In(V T i ) consists of nodes v with outdegree 0 (out(v) = 0), also called sink nodes, and Out(V T i ) consists of nodes v with indegree 0 (in(v) = 0), also called source nodes.
That is, in strictly intra-free coordination instances, we exclude tasks t where both out(t) > 0 as well as in(t) > 0. First, we will prove some results for strictly intra-free coordination instances. Then we will show that intra-free instances in general can be easily reduced to strictly intra-free coordination instances thereby proving that the properties holding for strictly infra-free instances also hold for this larger class of instances.
Given a partitioning {V T i } n i=1 of the set of nodes V T corresponding to the partitioning {T i } n i=1 , the coordination checking problem comes down to deciding whether for all possible acyclic extensions G *
While the problem to decide whether a given graph is acyclic is in P, the coordination problem is co-NP complete for general coordination instances.
The rather surprising result we prove now is that for (strictly) intra-free coordination instances, this coordination checking problem can be reduced to checking the acyclicity of an even (smaller) graph and hence, this problem is in P as well.
Here, we need to introduce the agent dependency graph G A derived from G T and the partitioning {T i } n i=1 of T : Definition 4.2 (Agent Dependency Graph). Given a task graph G T and a partitioning {T i } n i=1 , the agent dependency graph derived from G T is a graph G A = (V A , E A ), where V A = {v A i : A i ∈ A} is the set of nodes corresponding to agents, and
is the dependency relation between them.
Example 4.1. Consider the package delivery example (Example 2.1) discussed in Section 2, where four delivery tasks are allocated to two agents. Its task graph is illustrated in Figure 2(a) . Figure 2(b) shows its corresponding agent dependency graph.
There is a simple connection between coordination checking for T and acyclicity testing of G A : 5 Proposition 4.1. Let T = {T i } n i=1 , ≺ be a coordination instance and G A its associated agent dependency graph. Then G A is acyclic implies that T is coordinated, i.e., T is a yes-instance of the coordination checking problem.
In general, the converse of this proposition is not true: even if G A is cyclic, we might have a yesinstance of T .
Example 4.2. Consider the task graph shown in Figure 2(c) . Clearly, this instance is coordinated. The agent dependency graph, as shown in 2(b), however, contains a cycle: each of the agents is dependent upon the other as t 3 is dependent upon t 1 while t 2 is dependent upon t 4 .
, ≺ is a strictly intrafree coordination instance we can actually show that the converse holds, too:
, ≺ be a strictly intra-free coordination instance and G A its agent dependency graph. Then G A is acyclic iff T is a yesinstance of the coordination checking problem.
Note that these results hold for strictly intrafree coordination instances. It is, however, very easy to generalize them to intra-free coordination instances by polynomially reducing intra-free instances to strictly intra-free instances: we apply the following task-splitting procedure to tasks that violate the strict intra-free property.
Given an arbitrary intra-free coordination instance
, ≺ , for every i and every t ∈ T i such that in(t), out(t) > 0, do the following:
1. split t in two tasks t 1 and t 2 2. add all precedence constraints t ≺ t 1 such that t ≺ t and add t 2 ≺ t whenever t ≺ t ;
3. remove t and all precedence constraints it is mentioned in.
Clearly, the result is an equivalent strictly intra-free coordination instance.
Example 4.3. A simple example in Figure 3 illustrates how to convert an intra-free instance to a strictly intra-free instance. The task t of agent A 2 t t2 t1 A1 A3 A3 A2 A2 A1 Figure 3 : An intra-free coordination instance (first graph), converted to a strictly intra-free instance (second graph).
has been split into two tasks t 1 and t 2 . We can simply verify that when the (converted) strictly intra-free instance is coordinated, the (original) intra-free instance must be also coordinated.
Therefore, we obtain the following observation. T is coordinated whenever its strictly intra-free variant T is coordinated.
Based on these results we can now perform coordination checking in polynomial time: All we need to do is to find out if the agent dependency graph of the given intra-free instance is acyclic. This problem is known to be solvable in polynomial time (Cormen et al., 1990) .
Given the fact that coordination checking for intra-free instances is easy, one might hope that finding a minimum coordination set is also tractable in the case of intra-free coordination instances. This turns out to be wrong. Finding such a minimum set of coordination constraints is NP-hard as we have the following result:
Proposition 4.4. The NP-complete DIRECTED FEED-BACK VERTEX SET problem is polynomially reducible to the decision version of the minimum coordination problem for intra-free coordination instances.
Remark. In fact, it can be shown that the problem whether K given coordination arcs are sufficient to make an intra-free coordination instance coordinated can be decided in polynomial time. This shows that the problem is in NP, hence we can conclude that the coordination problem for intra-free instances is NPcomplete.
An Approximation Algorithm
We can use the agent dependency graph and the results obtained in the previous sections to obtain an approximation algorithm for constructing coordination sets in an easy way. The idea is, given an intra-free coordination instance, first to find an (approximate) minimum feedback vertex set V for the associated agent dependency graph and then to use this feedback vertex set V to create a sufficient set of coordination arcs by adequately blocking connections in the corresponding task sets of agents occurring in V . This blocking can be realized by adding arcs from all source to all sink tasks occurring in the task sets.
So the FVS-algorithm essentially consists of the following steps: 1. Given a coordination instance {T i } n i=1 , ≺ , create the associated agent dependency graph G A = V A , E A ; 2. Find an approximation 6 of a minimum directed feedback vertex set F ⊂ V A of G A . ;
3. For every v A i ∈ F, for every t ∈ Out(T i ) (source task) and for every t ∈ In(T i ) (sink task), add the coordination constraint t ≺ * i t thereby blocking any cycle passing through tasks belonging to A i .
It can be easily shown that in most cases this algorithm will outperform the existing depth partitioning algorithm (Steenhuisen et al., 2008) 7 .
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper identified a new subclass of coordination problems called intra-free coordination instances which have a relevance to model production and distribution planning problems in particular and supply chain planning in general. We have shown that the (decision version of the) plan coordination problem for this subproblem is NP-complete, instead of the Σ P 2 complexity of the general coordination problem. We also proposed a specialized approximation technique to design a 'good' set of coordination constraints in polynomial time.
As part of our future research, first of all we are investigating better heuristics for producing subset minimal coordination sets e.g., as we have discussed in the previous section, and we would like to refine the theoretical performance comparison analysis based upon them.
